The Ill Effect of Regionalism

In Chapter Six of The Working Landscape, Peter Cannavo stresses the importance of compromise and democratization in determining the future of land-use politics in the United States. Cannavo argues that the decision to develop or preserve open space can only be properly addressed if opposing parties put their competing interests aside and engage in rational conversation over the meaning of the proposed building site. In the same breadth, Cannavo supports further democratization of land-use issues. However, he believes the national government is currently not doing an adequate job of managing American land-use. Cannavo’s remedy is thus the decentralization of the national government’s authority over land-use with the aim of placing more power in the hands of state lawmakers and local political organizations. Cannavo’s goal of balancing founding and preservation is worthy, and his call for businesses and conservationists to reach a common ground is essential to the future sustainability of both world financial markets and the environment. However, the regionalization of politics is not currently a viable course of action.

Developers and conservationists agree that the Bureau of Land Management, the central government organization controlling land-use, does not sufficiently regulate the use of America’s open spaces. Yet, it is hard believe that local politicians would do a better job of deciding how land should and should not be developed. Take the St. Lawrence Cement case as an example. If that decision had been left entirely to Mayor Rick Scalera and the local board of officials, St. Lawrence Cement would have immediately broken ground on a new plant. The environmental and aesthetic concerns associated with the proposed “state-of-the-art” plant are debatable, but the measly sum of money Greenport, New York would have annually received from St. Lawrence Cement was set in stone. Scalera and his political minions were extremely shortsighted in accepting St. Lawrence Cement’s initial offer of $200,000 per year. It took these local politicians far too long to realize a) how small an annual payment of $200,000 was to a company like St. Lawrence Cement and b) how little such a sum would actually do for the community they represented. Moreover, the local political body that drove the decision making process in Greenport was uninformed, its members professed inconsistent opinions, and it was overall severely unorganized. Fortunately, a federal court mediated and eventually ruled on the debate between Greenport’s politicians and St. Lawrence Cement. Although the federal court considered the final anti-plant sentiment of Greenport’s local politicians, these judges recognized that St. Lawrence Cement was attempting to take advantage of Greenport’s location and its citizens. Greenport’s politicians were ineffective and helplessly blinded by their own passions because they were so attached to the land they were representing. They were also in a difficult situation because any decision they made would surely to lead to social unrest. However, the fact remains that they were terrible business negotiators because they nearly sold out Greenport to a powerful, multinational corporation for what would have amounted to a mere $4 million over twenty years!

My point is that regional political bodies will not legislate development better than branches of the national government. The national government employs lawyers and scientists to study the effects of proposed developments from an impartial standpoint, which limits corruption and does more to ensure fair rulings that combine economic and ecological interests. Unfortunately, serving the interests of all parties is not always feasible, but foundation and preservation can be balanced if a central authority ensures that developers and conservationists equally accumulate victories and defeats.